Allocating the Judicial Power in a \u27Unified Judiciary\u27 (Restructuring Federal Courts) by Caminker, Evan H.
University of Michigan Law School
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository
Articles Faculty Scholarship
2000
Allocating the Judicial Power in a 'Unified Judiciary'
(Restructuring Federal Courts)
Evan H. Caminker
University of Michigan Law School, caminker@umich.edu
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles/72
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Courts Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more
information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.
Recommended Citation
Caminker, Evan H. "Allocating the Judicial Power in a 'Unified Judiciary' (Restructuring Federal Courts)." Tex. L. Rev. 78, no. 7
(2000): 1513-48.




Over the past half-century, federal courts scholarship concerning
congressional control over the authority of Article III courts has focused
predominantly on the question of jurisdiction: Which, if any, federal courts
may or must be available to adjudicate which cases or controversies?'
This preoccupation is unsurprising since most threatened or actualized
congressional regulation over this period of time has concerned when and
* ProfessorofLaw, University of Michigan Law School. B.A. 1983, U.C.L.A.; J.D. 1986, Yale
University. I am currently on leave as Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Office of Legal
Counsel, United States Department of Justice. The views expressed herein are my own and do not
necessarily represent the views of the Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, or United States.
I wish to thank Jim Liebman for very helpful comments on an earlier draft of this essay.
1. Scholars have provided a wide range of answers: (1) Congress enjoys plenary control over all
Supreme appellate and inferior original and appellate jurisdiction. See Gerald Gunther, Congressional
Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN.
L. REV. 895 (1984); John Harrison, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts
and the Text of Article 11, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 203 (1997); Daniel J. Meltzer, The History and
Structure of Article Iff, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1569 (1990); Martin H. Redish, Article III and the
Judiciary Act of 1789: Text, Structure, and Common Sense in the Interpretation of Article 111, 138 U.
PA. L. REv. 1633 (1990). (2) Congress must authorize jurisdiction sufficient to preserve the "essential
functions" of the Supreme Court. See Henry M. Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction
of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARv. L. REv. 1362 (1953); Leonard G. Ratner,
Congressional Power over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 157
(1960). (3) Congress must authorize jurisdiction sufficient to preserve the supremacy-securing
.essential functions" of the federal judiciary writ large. See Lawrence G. Sager, The Supreme Court,
1980 Term-Forward: Constitutional Limitations on Congress' Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction
of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17 (1981). (4) Congress must provide jurisdiction to
entertain all "cases" but not all "controversies" listed in Article III somewhere in the federal judiciary.
See Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal
Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205 (1985). (5) Congress must provide jurisdiction to entertain all
.cases and controversies" listed in Article III somewhere in the federal judiciary. See Robert N.
Clinton, A Mandatory View of Federal Court Jurisdiction: A Guided Quest for the Original
Understanding of Article III, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 741 (1984). All of these scholars agree that
Congress enjoys at least some authority to allocate jurisdiction among the various federal courts; even
the "mandatory jurisdiction" theorists, who read Article III as demanding that some federal court be
available to hear certain cases and controversies, believe that Congress may select the particular court(s)
in which such jurisdiction should lie.
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which federal courts would play a role in implementing the law of the
land.2
Recent congressional reforms, however, have invited a shift in focus
away from the questions of "when and where" to the question of "how":
When Article III courts have jurisdiction to adjudicate a case, whether by
congressional invitation or constitutional compulsion, how may or must
those courts do so? Various provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA),3 the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), 4 and the Prison Litigation
Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA)5 regulate not only the time and place of
federal court adjudication of various federal claims, but also the manner in
which those courts adjudicate such claims. For example, in certain
circumstances the AEDPA requires federal courts to defer to the inte-
rpretive judgments of state courts, modifies the conventional rules of
precedential authority and stare decisis, and imposes time limitations on
judicial decisionmaking.'
These reforms have prompted more careful consideration of the
precise content of the adjudicatory powers granted to federal courts by the
Constitution. Article III's Vesting Clause clearly bestows "[t]he judicial
Power of the United States" in the federal judiciary, but provides no fur-
ther delineation of what exactly the judicial power is.7 In an impressive
recent article, Professor James Liebman and William Ryan canvass both the
drafting history of Article III and two centuries of Supreme Court case law,
concluding that "[t]he judicial Power" encompasses five essential quali-
tative attributes. When given jurisdiction, "[a]n Article III court must
decide (1) the whole federal question (2) independently and (3) finally,
based on (4) the whole supreme law, and (5) impose a remedy that, in the
process of binding the parties to the court's judgment, effectuates supreme
2. See, e.g., RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., Er AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 350-51 & nn. 12-17 (4th ed. 1996) (listing exemplar proposals to withdraw
federal court jurisdiction over various constitutional claims).
3. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (amending 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244, 2253-2255 and
adding §§ 2261-2266).
4. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-607 (1996).
5. Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321-66 (1996) (amending 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (1994)).
6. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (Supp. IV 1998) (forbidding a federal court from granting a writ of
habeas corpus unless the state court judgment was based on an unreasonable application of clearly
established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court or an unreasonable determination of the
facts); id. § 2244(b)(3)(D) (requiring that a court of appeals grant or deny the authorization to file a
second writ of habeas corpus application within 30 days of filing the motion for authorization); id.
§ 2263 (requiring the filing of a habeas corpus application within 180 days of the affirmance of the state
court conviction).
7. See, e.g., EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 16 (1914) ("[A]s to what
that [judicial] power is, what are its intrinsic nature and scope, [ithe Constitution] says not a word.")
(emphasis in original).
[Vol. 78:1513
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law and neutralizes contrary law."8 Other scholars commenting on vari-
ous aspects of the 1996 congressional reforms have also articulated or
explored at least partial definitions of the judicial power.9 A dialogue
exploring the irreducible attributes of the judicial power is thus emerging.
Scholars and courts identifying the judicial power's attributes have
almost invariably assumed that the judicial power-whatever it includes-is
vested identically and discretely in each and every Article III court created
by the Constitution or Congress. 0 According to this "discrete-vesting
postulate," the judicial power has a one-size-fits-all quality to it; by virtue
of the Vesting Clause, the power of any one federal court is identical to the
power of any other. It follows that any effort by Congress to burden or
restrain a specific federal court's exercise of its judicial power may be
evaluated in isolation, without considering whether other federal courts are
similarly burdened.
Upon reflection, however, this discrete-vesting postulate, when
coupled with conventional descriptions of judicial power attributes, proves
both descriptively and prescriptively problematic. Descriptively, it is
oversimplistic because it does not fit well with certain accepted features of
Article II adjudication. Even if each federal court is equally and
identically entitled to resist congressional, presidential, or state efforts to
compromise various attributes of its judicial power in favor of such
nonjudicial actors, different Article III courts enjoy somewhat different
packages of judicial power vis-a-vis each other, depending on their specific
role and placement within the integrated and hierarchical Article III system.
For example, the attribute of "finality" is commonly viewed as an essential
aspect of the judicial power, but only some and not other courts' rulings
possess this attribute. This differential allocation of certain judicial power
8. James S. Liebman & William F. Ryan, "Some Effectual Power": The Quantity and Quality of
Decisionmaking Required of Article III Courts, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 696, 696 (1998).
9. See, e.g., Vicki C. Jackson, Introduction: Congressional Control of Jurisdiction and the Future
of the Federal Courts-Opposition, Agreement, and Hierarchy, 86 GEO. L.J. 2445, 2461-64 (1998)
(discussing Congress's constitutional authority to limit remedies available to a federal court); id. at
2465-68 (considering whether federal courts have interpretive independence or are mere mouthpieces
of Congress); id. at 2469-70 (examining the claim that "it is an essential element of Article III
adjudication that the final judgments of Article III courts matter as precedent"). See also John
Harrison, Jurisdiction, Congressional Power and Constitutional Remedies, 86 GEO. L.J. 2513 (1998)
(evaluating Congress's authority to limit judicial remedies); Daniel J. Meltzer, Congress, Courts, and
Constitutional Remedies, 86 GEO. L.J. 2537,2549-65 (1998) (assessing the sufficiency of constitutional
remedies available to the courts); William F. Ryan, Rush to Judgment: A Constitutional Analysis of
Time Limits on Judicial Decisions, 77 B.U. L. REV. 761, 799-810 (1997) (discussing the constraints
on judicial deliberation of congressionally imposed time limits); Lawrence Gene Sager, Klein's First
Principle: A Proposed Solution, 86 GEO. L.J. 2525 (1998) (arguing that Congress cannot insist that a
federal court support Congress's interpretation of a law when such an interpretation runs contrary to
the court's best judgment).
10. See infra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
1515
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attributes rests in substantial tension with the conventional one-size-fits-all
characterization.
Prescriptively, the discrete-vesting postulate provides a misleading
analytical framework for evaluating arguable infringements of the judicial
power. Various challenges to Congress's recent restrictions on the manner
of federal court adjudication take the following form:
(a) X is an essential attribute of the judicial power;
(b) the provision in question deprives a specific federal court of X;
(c) therefore, the provision violates Article III.
Conclusion (c) follows from the discrete-vesting postulate because any
deprivation of any court's attribute X deprives that court of its inde-
pendently vested authority; whether other federal courts are similarly
burdened need not be considered. But this analytical framework is mis-
leading; certainly Congress may move some attributes of judicial power,
such as finality, from one federal court to another. A richer analytical
framework that contemplates and even explains Congress's ability to make
such moves would offer better guidance to courts having to decide whether
an attribute really must be vested in the particular court being constrained.
My principal goals in this Essay are threefold: to emphasize the
importance of considering the allocative aspects of various judicial power
attributes; to develop a taxonomy that helpfully describes and distinguishes
these allocative aspects; and to explore various ways of resolving the
apparent tension between these aspects and the presumed one-size-fits-all
vesting of the judicial power. In my view, the various attributes
comprising the judicial power fall into three allocative categories: intrinsic,
hierarchical, and systemic. Some judicial power attributes are, by their
very nature, intrinsic to each individual Article III court and cannot be
compromised or infringed by any governmental actor-including other
federal courts. Other attributes are hierarchical in nature, meaning that
they attach uniquely to courts in certain levels of the judicial hierarchy,
perhaps the Supreme Court, all appellate tribunals, or all original tribunals.
Lastly, some attributes are conferred upon the federal judiciary as a whole
rather than upon any particular court or level of court. Congress thus has
some control over where these systemic attributes are vested, though Con-
gress must ensure they are vested in some federal court such that they are
brought to bear in every case or controversy. In other words, Congress
enjoys some authority to allocate systemic attributes of the judicial power
so long as it allocates that power among-rather than away from-Article
III courts. This taxonomy of allocative features calls into question the
conventional view that Article III's Vesting Clause bestows a uniform
package of decisionmaking attributes upon each federal court in a one-size-
[Vol. 78:1513
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fits-all fashion. Instead, I propose, it is more useful heuristically to view
this clause as bestowing a set of decisionmaking attributes in the federal
judiciary as a unified system. Rather than regarding federal courts as
discretely exercising a predetermined and uniform set of powers, we should
conceptualize them as exercising the judicial power in concert as inter-
connected members of a unified judiciary. Doing so will illuminate the
proper resolution of current Article III controversies involving con-
gressional regulation of the manner of judicial decisionmaking."
Part II of this Essay delineates the essential attributes of Article III's
judicial power. Part III develops the discrete-vesting postulate, considers
its apparent tension with the well-established differential allocation of
certain judicial power attributes among various federal courts, and develops
a tripartite taxonomy of specific judicial power attributes: intrinsic,
hierarchical, and systemic. Part IV explores three approaches to recon-
ciling the tension between this taxonomy of allocative features and the
conventional view that the judicial power is vested in each Article III court
in a one-size-fits-all fashion. The third approach here is novel, positing
that the judicial power is vested globally in the aggregate of all Article Im
courts rather than discretely in each such court. Finally, Part V demons-
trates that the unified judiciary perspective provides a more nuanced
analytical framework by illustrating its application to a contemporary
challenge to section 2254(d)(1) of the AEDPAs recent modification of
conventional rules of precedent in habeas litigation.
II. The Essential Attributes of Article III's Judicial Power
The Vesting Clause of Article III provides: "The judicial Power of the
United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior
Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.""
This clause does two things. First, it designates the recipients of the
"judicial Power" delegated by the Constitution; such power is vested fully
and exclusively in Article III courts. Second, it directly confers a power
11. I do not engage here in the debate over whether constraints imposed on various judicial power
attributes by non-Article III actors should be considered per se invalid or should be evaluated according
to some balancing rubric (perhaps considering both the degree of the constraint and the governmental
interests served thereby). The Court has employed different approaches to this problem in different
contexts. Compare, e.g., Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 239 (1995) ("In its major
features (of which the conclusiveness ofjudicial judgments is assuredly one) [the doctrine of separation
of powers] is a prophylactic device, establishing high walls and clear distinctions because low walls and
vague distinctions will not be judicially defensible in the heat of interbranch conflict."), with
Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851 (1986) ("weigh[ing] a number of
factors, none of which has been deemed determinative, with an eye to the practical effect that the
congressional action will have on the constitutionally assigned role of the federal judiciary."). My
focus is on the question of whether a congressional regulation of the manner of adjudication infringes
at all upon the judicial power vested in federal courts.
12. U.S. CONS!'. art. Il, § 1.
1517
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to engage in coercive governmental activity of a particular sort-the sort
encompassed by the admittedly ambiguous "judicial Power." Congress has
some control over the number of federal courts authorized to decide cases
and controversies, and over the jurisdiction of each specific court, 3 but
the federal courts created and imbued with jurisdiction derive their power
to act directly from the opening sentence of Article rn. 4  Thus while
Congress has some control over "when and where" the judicial power is
exercised, the Vesting Clause itself establishes the "who and what"-who
has the power and of what that power consists.'15
Of course, to say that the Vesting Clause devolves upon Article I
courts a "nebulous grantHl of power"16 is somewhat of an understate-
ment; one must certainly go beyond that sparse phrase to discover the
power's specific attributes. Various interpretive routes might prove
profitable. The content of the judicial power might be gleaned by examin-
ing the specifications following the Vesting Clause in Article II's further
provisions.' 7 History might provide additional insights, since in some
ways the Article III judicial power was modelled by the Framers on the
"business of the Colonial courts and the courts of Westminster when the
Constitution was framed." 8 A more thorough-going functionalist analysis
13. See supra note 1; Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Supreme Court
Precedents?, 46 STAN. L. REv. 817, 823-24 (1994) (discussing Congress's role in determining the
number and specific jurisdiction of lower federal courts); James E. Pfander, Jurisdiction Stripping and
the Supreme Court's Power to Supervise Inferior Tribunals, 78 TEXAS L. REV. 1433, 1452-54 (2000)
(discussing Congress's power regarding the federal courts); Ryan, supra note 9 (discussing Congress's
authority to regulate the jurisdiction, procedure, and practice of lower federal courts).
14. See Michaelson v. United States, 266 U.S. 42, 65-66 (1924) ("The Courts of the United
States, when called into existence and vested with jurisdiction over any subject, at once become
possessed of the [judicial] power... ; the attributes which inhere in that power and are inseparable
from it can neither be abrogated nor rendered practically inoperative.").
15. Some scholars have suggested that the similarly-worded Vesting Clauses of Articles II and II
concern only the "who" rather than the "what" aspect of power-conferral, merely designating the
recipient of a particular form of power without conferring any substantive power at all. See, e.g., A.
Michael Froomkin, The Imperial Presidency's New Vestments, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 1346 (1994).
Professor Froomkin argues that the substantive powers conferred upon the president and federal courts
are conferred not by the Vesting Clauses but rather by subsequent clauses in Articles II and II. In
particular, Froomkin contends that the authority to exercise the judicial power is granted by the
sentence in Article III, Section 2 specifying that the "judicial Power shall extend to" a menu of cases
and controversies. The better view, however, is that the Vesting Clauses both confer power and
designate the recipients of that power, identifying (however sketchily) the "what" as well as the "who"
of the executive and judicial powers. For a persuasive defense of this interpretive position, see Steven
G. Calabresi, The Vesting Clauses as Power Grants, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 1377, 1378-1400 (1994).
16. Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive,
Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REv. 1155, 1195 (1992) (comparing the grants of power in Articles
II and III with that in Article I).
17. See, e.g., Calabresi, supra note 15, at 1389-1400 (claiming that while the meaning of Article
III's Vesting Clause can be determined in part by examining its interplay with the Vesting Clauses of
Articles I and I, its content is more clearly discerned from subsequent language in Article III itself).
18. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 150 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring). See also James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 549 (Scalia, J.,
1518 [Vol. 78:1513
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might provide further illumination since the judicial power was designed
(in tandem with the Supremacy Clause) in part to secure the supremacy of
federal law.9
The judicial power includes some "inherent" or "implied" powers of
a case-management or supervisory nature "to manage [a court's] own
affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases."'
The judicial power also includes some authority to supervise the behavior
of subordinate officials, both in the judiciary and in other branches of
government. 2' However, the core of the judicial power, and my primary
focus here, is the authority to adjudicate and resolve Article I cases and
controversies. I will call this the adjudicatory aspect of the judicial power
so as to distinguish it from ancillary managerial or supervisory powers over
the courtroom, litigants, and subordinate officials. '
concurring) ("'The judicial Power of the United States' ... must be deemed to be the judicial power
as understood by our common-law tradition.").
19. See Liebman & Ryan, supra note 8, at 704 ("As did the Framers, ... the Court has
understood those qualities [of judicial decisionmaking] and that 'Power' as principally designed to
maintain-and to ensure that 'the Judges in every State' maintain-[the supremacy of national law].
Only by reference to the Supremacy Clause, that is, can the nature of '[t]he judicial Power' be
understood.").
20. Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962). See also Chambers v. NASCO,
Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991) ("It has long been understood that '[c]ertain implied powers must
necessarily result to our Courts of justice from the nature of their institution,' powers 'which cannot
be dispensed with in a Court, because they are necessary to the exercise of all others.'") (quoting
United States v. Hudson, II U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812)). For example, the Supreme Court has
held that Article Ill courts possess inherent power to, "within limits, formulate procedural rules not
specifically required by the Constitution or the Congress," United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 505
(1983); to appoint private attorneys to prosecute contempt sanctions for in-court conduct, see Young
v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 793 (1987); and to stay their own
proceedings for equitable reasons, see Landis v. North American Co., 299 U.S. 248,254 (1936). For
a more exhaustive list of different aspects of the inherent power in various procedural contexts, see
NASCO, 501 U.S. at 43-46.
As is the case with various case-deciding components of the judicial power, the Court has yet
to establish clear guidelines as to whether and when federal courts' inherent managerial powers are
entirely defeasible by Congress or subject to some congressional regulation so long as the powers
remain adequate for their essential purposes. See, e.g., NASCO, 501 U.S. at 47-48 n. 12 (declining the
invitation to decide whether some inherent powers are "irreducible powers derived from Article III"
which are not defeasible by Congress, or "essential powers ... which can be legislatively regulated
but not abrogated"); id. at 58 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Some elements of that inherent authority are so
essential to 'the judicial Power' . . . that they are indefeasible. . . ."); id. at 59-60 ("Just as Congress
may... specify the manner in which the inherent or constitutionally assigned powers of the President
will be exercised, so long as the effectiveness of those powers is not impaired, so also Congress may
prescribe the means by which the courts may protect the integrity of their proceedings.") (citation
omitted); id. at 64 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("[O]ur cases recognize that Rules and statutes limit the
exercise of inherent authority.").
21. See generally Pfander, supra note 13 (examining the development and current status of the
Supreme Court's power to supervise such other governmental actors through supervisory writs).
22. Some scholars maintain that the judicial power does not just encompass some capacity and
obligation to decide cases over which a federal court is independently granted jurisdiction (by
Constitution or statute), but also itself "comprehends the subject matter jurisdiction to decide all cases
in certain categories." Amar, supra note 1, at 231 n.88. I and others disagree with this merger of theHeinOnline  -- 78 Tex. L. Rev.  1519 1999-2000
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To date, the most comprehensive and intensive effort to specify the
precise contours of this adjudicatory aspect of the judicial power is the
recent and impressive scholarship by Professor Jim Liebman and William
RyanY After canvassing in great detail the drafting history of Article III
and considering the interplay of numerous canonical and more esoteric
Supreme Court decisions concerning judicial authority, Liebman and Ryan
conclude that the judicial power encompasses a series of distinct, though
related, qualitative attributes. Specifically, their summary of the essential
attributes of the judicial power is this:
Read, as designed, in conjunction with the Supremacy Clause, "[t]he
judicial Power" means the Article III judge's authority and
obligation, in all matters over which jurisdiction is conferred,
independently, finally, and effectually to decide the whole case and
nothing but the case on the basis, and so as to maintain the
supremacy, of the whole federal law. By "independently, finally,
and effectually decide," we mean dispositively to arrange the rights
and responsibilities of the parties on the basis of independently
developed legal reasons, subject to review only by a superior Article
III court. By "case," we mean a court action that can be resolved
on the basis of enforceable law, and by "whole case," we mean not
only the "construction" of applicable provisions of law but also their
actual application to the facts to reach a decision. By deciding
"nothing but the case," we mean a court's insulation from formally
giving advice to another agency of government, particularly advice
of a political nature, either inside or outside the context of particular
disputes. By "maintaining the supremacy of the whole federal law,"
we mean (1) giving the entire body of hierarchically ordered federal
law the effect on the decision that the law, on its own terms,
demands, and (2) treating as void any law or judicial decision-most
explicitly, any state law or judicial decision-that is contrary to
hierarchically ordered federal law and to which the case necessarily
calls the federal court's attention.24
concepts of "judicial power" and "jurisdiction" to exercise it, see, e.g., Liebman & Ryan, supra note
8, at 752 (describing the Framers' debates over Article III as cognizant of and concerning the
distinction between jurisdiction and judicial power); Harrison, supra note 1, at 214 ("Article Ill's shift
in Section 2 from the judicial power.., is a natural way of expressing separate answers to the separate
questions of the maximum scope of the lawsuits federal courts may be able to decide and the actual
rules that determine the lawsuits they will be able to decide at any time."). I do not explore here the
implications of this distinction for theories about the mandatory allocation of jurisdiction over certain
categories of cases.
23. Liebman & Ryan, supra note 8.
24. Id. at 771 (emphasis in original and other emphases omitted) (footnotes omitted). The authors
elsewhere flesh out the demands of these specific attributes, see id. at 768-73, and discuss numerous
precedents exploring them, see id. at 773-850.
1520 [Vol. 78:1513
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Other scholars have recently focused more discretely on specific aspects of
the adjudicatory function. Professor Larry Sager, for example, has
deployed a fresh interpretation of United States v. Klein5 to argue that the
attribute of interpretive independence inhering in the grant of judicial
power precludes Congress from ordering courts to articulate existing law
as Congress, rather than the courts, sees fit, thus "conscript[ing] the
judiciary in a constitutional charade."' Professor Vicki Jackson has
suggested that it might be "an essential element of Article III adjudication
that the final judgments of Article III courts matter as precedent." 7
Lastly, William Ryan has proposed that the attribute of independent
adjudication might be compromised by congressionally imposed time limits
on judicial deliberation and decisionmaking.5
Of course, one can take issue with any proposed list of judicial power
attributes or with the precise contours of any listed attribute.29 I intend
to do neither here. I assume arguendo that Liebman and Ryan, as supple-
mented by others, have accurately captured the essential attributes of
judicial decisionmaking mandated by Article III's Vesting Clause. My
primary interest, rather, is in exploring the allocative aspects of those
attributes in a unified judiciary.
Ill. Allocative Features of the Judicial Power's Essential Attributes
A. The Misleading Nature of the One-Size-Fits-All Approach to the
Vesting of Judicial Power
The United States Constitution establishes a single Congress and single
President but a "plural" judiciary, plural in the sense that it bestows the
25. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871).
26. Sager, supra note 9, at 2528. 1 agree in principle with Professor Sager's claim of interpretive
independence in this regard, though I also agree with Professor Dan Meltzer's response that Sager
applies his thesis too broadly, see Meltzer, supra note 9, at 2545-49.
27. Jackson, supra note 9, at 2469.
28. William Ryan argues that:
A practice is objectionable as unduly interfering with the judiciary's core inherent power
to decide contested cases when it interferes with the judiciary's decisionmaking function
and poses a risk of decreasing judges' impartiality, blurring lines of public accountability
or increasing the potential for arbitrary decisions. A congressionally imposed time limit
on judicial decisions can have both effects.
See Ryan, supra note 9, at 798.
29. For example, recent scholarship highlights a disagreement about what it means to issue an
"effectual" remedy for constitutional violations. Compare, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and
Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1427 (1987) (arguing that governments acting unconstitutionally "must
in some way undo the violation by ensuring that victims are made whole"), with Harrison, supra note
9, at 2522 (rejecting the argument that governments have such a broad affirmative remedial duty and
concluding that "[i]t seems entirely possible that the self-executing force of Section 1 [of the Fourteenth
Amendment] is limited to nullification" of the state's illegal action). See generally John C. Jeffries, Jr.,
The Right-Remedy Gap in ConstitutionalLaw, 109 YALE L.J. 87 (1999) (describing various approaches
to evaluating the propriety of the right-remedy gap).
1521
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judicial power on a department that, at Congress's discretion, may include
multiple courts.3" Moreover, the judges sitting on congressionally
created Article III courts enjoy a significant degree of structural parity. As
Professor Akhil Amar has emphasized, "[t]he structural mechanisms to
assure independence and competence in the federal judiciary-appointment,
confirmation, tenure and salary guarantees, and impeachment-are the
same for all Article III judges, supreme and inferior."3 Thus, con-
ventional wisdom holds that the judicial power, whatever attributes it
includes, is vested discretely in each Article III court established by the
Constitution or by Congress pursuant thereto so that:
[w]henever called upon to decide those matters [within the specified
categories of cases and controversies], federal judges would be
required to deploy the qualities-the decisionmaking powers and
responsibilities-inherent in "[t]he Judicial Power" and thus inherent
in every court constituted by or under the judiciary article.3"
30. See generally Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 16 (comparing the internal structures of the
three branches of the federal government). The legislative power is vested nondelegably in a bicameral
Congress. The executive power, Calabresi and Rhodes maintain, is likewise "unitary" in the sense that
power is vested exclusively in the president, and all executive power exercised by other executive
officials is exercised on the president's behalf through his actual or constructive delegation of power
to his subordinates. Id. at 1181-82, 1203. The judicial branch is non-unitary, or "plural," in the sense
that the judicial power is not vested exclusively in the Supreme Court and then delegated by it to
inferior tribunals. See, e.g., Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 870 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that inferior
courts do not rely on the Supreme Court for their authority); Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 16, at
1184 n.158 (contrasting Congress's power to create inferior courts with full statutory and constitutional
power with the requirement that the president enable statutorily created executive agencies).
31. Amar, supra note 1, at 230. Of course, structural parity among judges does not necessarily
entail institutional parity among courts; the textual designations "supreme" and "inferior" courts reflect
some important distinctions between these two levels of court in our hierarchical system. See infra
notes 109-124 and accompanying text (discussing implications for congressional allocation of
precedential authority). See generally Caminker, supra note 13 (examining the doctrine of hierarchical
precedent).
32. Liebman & Ryan, supra note 8, at 752 (emphasis added); see id. at 708 (contending that the
phrase "'shall be vested in one supreme Court and in such inferior courts . . .' meant that and not
'shall be vested in one supreme Court or in such inferior courts'") (emphasis in original); id. at 741
("[The Wilson-Rutledge draft [of Article IJl] defined a characteristic that all, and only, federal judges
had: the duty and responsibility to exercise the 'Judicial Power of the United States.'" (emphasis
added)); id. at 751 ("Section 1 of the judiciary provision that emerged from the Committee of Detail
had vested '[tihe Judicial Power' in its entirety "in" each and every inferior court that the national
legislature chose to constitute as well as 'in' the constitutionally created supreme court." (emphasis in
original and emphasis added)); id. at 882 ("[The plain text of Article III ... vests the whole 'judicial
Power' in any inferior court Congress creates.") (emphasis added); see also Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d
856, 869 (7th Cir. 1996) (en banc) ("[T]he judicial power is given by the Constitution to each of the
inferior Article 1I1 courts.") (emphasis added), rev'd on othergrounds, 521 U.S. 320 (1997); Calabresi,
supra note 15, at 1382 ("The [Vesting] Clause... specif[ies] that national judicial powers 'must' be
given to both the one Supreme Court and to the inferior courts. Thus, a national power is created, and
it is given equally both to the Supreme and inferior federal courts between which a certain parity might
be said to exist." (emphasis added)); Harrison, supra note 1, at 210 ("Whatever federal courts there
are have the power to decide cases and controversies for the national government because they have
the judicial power."); cf Ryan, supra note 9, at 812 ("The grant of independent decisionmaking
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Based on this discrete-vesting interpretation of the Vesting Clause, one
would expect that the attributes of the judicial power-again, whatever they
specifically may be-are identical for each and every federal court,
supreme or inferior. In other words, the judicial power is bestowed upon
every federal court in a one-size-fits-all manner. Since each court receives
the same judicial power, no court should have any greater or lesser
authority than the next.
As the ensuing discussion reveals, however, this seemingly straight-
forward deduction from the discrete-vesting postulate is demons-trably
inconsistent with longstanding and uncontroversial practice. Efforts to
define the judicial power with respect to its adjudicatory attributes typically
focus on the relationship between courts and actors external to Article
HI,33 but the relationship between federal courts is conceptually signifi-
cant as well. If one-size-fits-all is an apt description of the way in which
the judicial power is vested, then one court's essential attributes can no
more be curtailed in favor of another actor within the Article III judiciary
than in favor of an external actor. Yet there are numerous well-established
circumstances in which a supposedly essential attribute of one federal
court's power is curtailed in deference to another, usually a superior,
federal court's authority. A few examples will suffice to demonstrate the
point.
Consider "finality." Both scholars and the Court have declared that
finality is one of the essential attributes of the judicial power vested in
federal courts and therefore judicial decisions cannot be subject to revision
or supplantation by legislatures, executive officials, or even state courts.34
It is clear, however, that a federal court lacks finality in the sense that its
rulings can be revised by superior federal courts with appellate jurisdiction
over it. One must therefore qualify the judicial power attribute of finality
vested in a particular federal court by characterizing its decisions as final
vis-a-vis external actors but potentially nonfinal vis-a-vis other Article rI
courts. Thus the Court is careful to state that the judicial power gives
federal courts authority to decide cases dispositively, subject to review by
a superior federal court.35
authority runs to each Article I judge, not just to the judiciary in general or to courts as a whole.").
But see Amar, supra note 1, at 231 (arguing that the Vesting Clause of Article III establishes "that the
judicial power of the United States must be vested in the federal judiciary as a whole") (emphasis in
original).
33. This external category includes Congress; the federal executive branch; and state legislative,
executive, and judicial bodies.
34. See, e.g., Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 217-39 (1994) (invalidating a
congressional statute that commanded federal courts to reopen final judgments by extending the statute
of limitations applicable thereto); Liebman & Ryan, supra note 8, at 783-810.
35. See, e.g., Plaut, 514 U.S. at 218-19 (holding that Article III "gives the Federal Judiciary the
power, not merely to rule on cases, but to decide them, subject to review only by superior courts in the
Article III hierarchy-with an understanding, in short, that a 'judgment conclusively resolves the case'
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Consider next "interpretive independence." The judicial power
encompasses the authority and duty to "say what the law is"31 in the
federal court's own best independent judgment. Congress, for example,
may not command a federal court to defer to Congress's understanding of
the law37 or to a state court's legal interpretation, 38 nor may Congress
order a federal court to articulate as law a principle with which the court
disagrees.39  But a federal court's interpretive independence is often
compromised by the views of fellow courts within the Article III hierarchy.
The doctrine of stare decisis requires a deciding court to defer substantially
to its own prior rulings' and sometimes a deciding court must defer
completely to another court's rulings. Most starkly, whenever a higher
court reverses a lower court decision and remands the case for further
proceedings consistent with the higher court's opinion, the lower court is
effectively commanded to exercise its judicial power in a manner it
independently believes to be erroneous. Congress may not be able to tell
an inferior tribunal to say that the Free Exercise Clause really means X,41
for example, but a superior tribunal surely may do so. More subtly, the
general requirement that inferior courts obey legal precedents established
by superior courts with revisory jurisdiction over them means that lower
courts' interpretive authority is meaningfully constrained rather than truly
independent.42 Even more narrowly, the "law of the case" doctrine holds
because 'a "judicial Power" is one to render dispositive judgments.'") (emphasis in original and
emphasis added) (citation omitted); Lindh, 96 F.3d at 870 ("[When these [Article III] courts act within
their jurisdictions, they exercise the judicial power directly, though subject to the limits of revisionary
jurisdiction of a court superior within the Article I hierarchy.") (emphasis added and emphasis
omitted); Liebman & Ryan, supra note 8, at 771 ("By 'independently, finally, and effectually decide,'
we mean dispositively to arrange the rights and responsibilities of the parties on the basis of
independently developed legal reasons, subject to review only by a superior Article III court.")
(emphasis added and original emphasis omitted).
36. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
37. See, e.g., Liebman & Ryan, supra note 8, at 811-15 (identifying Marbury as the canonical
case establishing thejudiciary's "interpretive independence" from Congress); id. at 815-23 (citing Klein
for the proposition that Congress may confer jurisdiction but may not direct the exercise of jurisdiction
conferred).
38. This principle was recently affirmed by the Seventh Circuit:
Congress lacks power to revise the meaning of the Constitution or to require federal
judges to 'defer' to the interpretations reached by state courts. Once the judicial power
is brought to bear by the presentation of a justiciable case or controversy within a
statutory grant ofjurisdiction, the federal courts' independent interpretive authority cannot
constitutionally be impaired.
Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 872 (7th Cir. 1996). See also Liebman & Ryan, supra note 8, at 831-
54 (reviewing cases which held that state court decisions cannot constrain the federal judiciary).
39. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
40. See Caminker, supra note 13, at 818.
41. See Sager, supra note 9, at 2532-33 (applying his Klein-driven principle of independence to
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act).
42. In Lindh, the Seventh Circuit explained this constraint:
Judges of the inferior courts must implement the views of their superiors, from which it
follows that many decisions of the lower courts will be inconsistent with the conclusions
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that "when a court decides upon a rule of law, that decision should
continue to govern the same issues in subsequent stages in the same case,"
a rule which "applies as much to the decisions of a coordinate court in the
same case as to a court's own decisions."4'
Consider lastly the duty to apply the "whole law" pertinent to a case,
which I will call "comprehensivity." Liebman and Ryan maintain that the
judicial power encompasses the authority and duty to "apply the whole
supreme national law to any case before the Court."' As they show, the
Supreme Court has consistently resisted express or implied efforts by
Congress to deny federal courts' resort to particular aspects of federal law
when adjudicating a case. For example, recall Chief Justice Marshall's
famous rhetorical question in Marbury v. Madison: "In some cases, then,
the constitution must be looked into by the judges. And if they can open
it at all, what parts of it are they forbidden to read, or to obey?"'4 The
clear answer is that Article I precludes Congress from ordering federal
courts to "close their eyes on the Constitution, and see only the [statutory]
law."' More generally, Congress may not require a federal court to
decide a case based on consideration of only some but not all applicable
federal law.47
That is, Congress may not do so unless the issue withheld from the
federal court is adjudicable in some other federal court. In Yakus v. United
States,4" for example, the Court upheld a statute that barred federal courts
entertaining criminal enforcement actions from considering the consti-
tutionality of the price-fixing regulations being enforced.49 Even though
their judges would have reached, if unfettered by precedent. Applying, even predicting,
the work of other judges, rather than reaching independent conclusions, makes up the bulk
of the work of a federal judge ....
Lindh, 96 F.3d at 873. See generally Caminker, supra note 13 (exploring and evaluating rationales
underlying the well-established doctrine of hierarchical precedent within the federal judiciary).
43. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 816 (1988) (quoting Arizona v.
California, 460 U.S. 605, 618 (1983)).
44. Liebman & Ryan, supra note 8, at 814 (citing Chief Justice Marshall); see generally id. at
810-37 (expanding and illustrating this claim).
45. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 179 (1803).
46. Id. at 178; see also Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM.
L. REV. 1, 11 (1983) ("There is no half-way position in constitutional cases; so long as it is directed
to decide the case, an article III court cannot be 'jurisdictionally' shut off from full consideration of the
substantive constitutional issues.. ").
47. See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414,468 (1944) (Rutledge, J., dissenting) ("[W]henever
the judicial power is called into play, it is responsible directly to the fundamental law and no other
authority can intervene to force or authorize the judicial body to disregard it."). The Court has
subsequently treated this dissenting statement as authoritative. See Liebman & Ryan, supra note 8, at
829 (discussing cases).
48. 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
49. Id. Yakus was convicted in federal district court of having sold meat above administratively
established price limits authorized by emergency legislation during World War1. Id. at 418. At trial,
Yakus tried to challenge the price limits as unconstitutionally confiscatory. Id. at 419. The district
court refused to consider this claim, however, on the ground that the statute prohibited federal courtsHeinOnline  -- 78 Tex. L. Rev.  1525 1999-2000
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the statute required these enforcement courts to close their eyes to the legal
challenge against the regulations' validity, the Court rejected Yakus's claim
that the statute thus unconstitutionally compromised the enforcement courts'
judicial power.50 The Court observed that the statute provided whole-
salers such as Yakus a fair pre-enforcement opportunity to challenge the
price-fixing regulations through administrative action, coupled with review
by the Article III Emergency Court of Appeals and access to Supreme
Court review." Thus, while the statute technically deprived enforcement
courts from considering the "whole law" applicable to the case, it did so
only by horizontally reallocating the power to consider the constitutional
challenge to another Article III tribunal.52 As the Court noted, the
challenge did not need to be heard "in one [Article III] tribunal rather than
in another, so long as there [was] an opportunity" for a fair challenge in
at least one of them. 3" In other words, the judicial power of the
enforcement courts could be compromised if that attribute withheld was
reserved for some other Article III court.
These examples make apparent that at least certain attributes of the
judicial power mean one thing when threatened by actors external to the
federal judiciary and quite another when threatened by actors inside the
Article III hierarchy. The practical judicial power of two federal courts
can differ because of the particular role Congress has asked each to play
in the judiciary writ large. One court might enjoy plenary authority to
determine fully and finally every legal issue arising in a specific case while
a second court is permitted to determine only a subset of legal issues raised
(deferring in part to another court) and to do so contingently, subject to
revision by a superior court. This differential allocation of power is
dictated by Congress, which determines each court's authority by establish-
ing both the specific scope of its jurisdiction (whole versus partial case
review) and the reviewability of its decisions by another federal court.
Thus, there emerges what might be called a "practice-postulate gap"-a
disjunction between the allocation of judicial power in actual practice and
the allocation theorized by the discrete-vesting postulate.
B. A Taxonomy of the Allocative Features of Judicial Power Attributes
The preceding illustrations of this practice-postulate gap suggest that
various judicial power attributes can be distinguished according to their
allocative features. In my view, these features can usefully be categorized
entertaining enforcement actions from inquiring into the underlying validity of the price-fixing
regulations. Id.
50. See id. at 428-29.
51. See id. at 435-36.
52. Id. at 444-46.
53. Id. at 444.
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as follows: intrinsic, hierarchical, and systemic. In this Section I define
and illuminate each category with examples, though it is decidedly not my
goal here to provide a detailed justification for how each and every
proposed judicial power attribute should be classified. Rather, I offer some
tentative classifying judgments merely to illustrate my proposed taxonomy.
1. IntrinsicAttributes.-"Intrinsic" attributes of the judicial power are
those which must be exercised by each and every discrete court adjudi-
cating a case. Inherent managerial powers related to case and courtroom
supervision, considered so "necessary to the exercise of all others"' that
they are indefeasible by Congress, certainly fall into this category. 5 With
respect to adjudicatory aspects of the judicial power, certainly the authority
to decide a case inheres in each federal court vested with jurisdiction over
said case. Moreover, other adjudicatory attributes might properly be
considered intrinsic to each court.
Consider, for example, Professor Larry Sager's argument that Con-
gress may not "conscript the judiciary in a constitutional charade" by
ordering a court to articulate constitutional principles consonant with
Congress's preferred views rather than with its own best judgment.56
Professor Sager might persuasively argue that Congress cannot make any
federal court its "puppet" in this manner, even just an intermediate court
whose ruling will be reviewed by another court not similarly constrained.
In two senses, the anti-conscription doctrine has expressive elements. In
form, congressional conscription improperly makes the court appear sub-
ordinate to the legislature; in content, conscription improperly requires that
the court articulate an erroneous (from its perspective) rule of law that
might confuse and mislead the public. These expressive concerns arise
from the conscription of any single federal court, whether or not that court
has the final say in the case. 7 Thus the anti-conscription attribute defined
by Sager arguably falls within the intrinsic category.
54. United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812).
55. See id. (noting that such "implied powers must necessarily result to our courts of justice from
the nature of their institution"); Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43, 44 (1991) (stating that
the power to discipline attorneys and punish them for contempt is "incidental to all Courts" and
"inherent in all courts") (citations omitted); Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 264
(1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[E]very United States court has an inherent supervisory authority over
the proceedings conducted before it ...
56. Sager, supra note 9, at 2528.
57. If a superior court (perhaps the Supreme Court) retains interpretive independence from
Congress and thus can revise the conscripted court's ruling before it becomes final, then at least the
law as ultimately articulated and applied to the specific case will be untainted by congressional decree.
However, the expressive concerns driving Sager's interpretation of Klein's anti-conscription principle
are at best somewhat muted, but certainly not fully abated.
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2. Hierarchical Attributes.-"Hierarchical" attributes of the judicial
power are those whose functional justifications are served so long as they
are brought to bear by a court at a specific level in the judicial hierarchy.
Such attributes are fully vested in the judiciary so long as they are
exercised by the designated recipient level of court. 8 The exalted status
of the "one supreme Court"59 might refer to certain features of that Court
unrelated to its exercise of judicial power, but it appears to qualify its
reposition of judicial power in various ways as well.' With respect to
non-adjudicatory functions, the Court has occasionally suggested that it
enjoys some unique supervisory authority over the procedures and case-
management practices of all inferior federal courts, t and arguably the
Court enjoys certain forms of supervisory authority over various aspects
of subordinate official decisionmaking as well.' With respect to
adjudicatory functions, Professor Akhil Amar has argued that Supreme
Court decisions uniquely must have the attribute of finality because it is the
58. It is conceptually possible to attach certain attributes of judicial power uniquely to trial courts
(e.g., fact finding) or to all inferior courts (e.g., remedial discretion) but arguments that Article Ill
vests certain attributes of judicial power uniquely in the Supreme Court seem more persuasive.
59. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
60. Professor Akhil Amar has suggested that the Court's "supreme" status might refer to four
structural features: it is the only court created by the Constitution rather than by Congress, it is the only
court whose jurisdiction is constitutionally bestowed and defined, it is the only court with an irreducible
original jurisdiction, and it is the only court from which no appeal could constitutionally lie. See
Amar, supra note 1, at 221 n.60. For an argument that these structural features cannot persuasively
be understood to exhaust the meaning of "supreme," see Caminker, supra note 13, at 828-30.
Some might view the adjective "supreme" as itself bestowing a unique set of powers on the court
so designated. See, e.g., Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 16, at 1176 n.115 (positing that the use of
the adjective "supreme" may constitute an additional and "implicit grant of power to the Supreme Court
to reverse the judgment of the inferior courts and to bind them with precedents"); Pfander, supra note
13, at 1451-52 (deriving the Supreme Court's supervisory authority from its status as the "supreme"
court compared to "inferior" courts). However, as explained earlier, see supra note 15 and accom-
panying text, the Vesting Clause of Article Ill appears to be the only clause that actually grants any
judicial power to any federal court; cf. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (authorizing "Courts of Law"
to receive and exercise a quasi-executive appointments power). I believe the better view is that Article
III's use of the adjectives "supreme" and "inferior," augmented by Article I, section 8, clause 9's
authorization of Congress to constitute tribunals "inferior to" the Supreme Court, guides the proper
understanding and allocation of the judicial power attributes bestowed upon these courts by the Vesting
Clause itself.
61. See, e.g., McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 341 (1943) (stating that the Supreme Court
has "supervisory authority over the administration of criminal justice in the federal courts," including
the authority to formulate rules governing court proceedings) (citations omitted). But see Evan
Caminker & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Lawless Execution ofRobert Alton Harris, 102 YALE L.J. 225,
250 (1992) (questioning whether the Court enjoys a unique power to supervise inferior courts "beyond
th[e] traditional sense of reviewing the soundness of a lower court's exercise of the power to manage
its own proceedings").
62. See Pfander, supra note 13. Pfander argues that the Court's "supreme" status entails that it
possess some minimal authority to supervise subordinate courts through various extraordinary writs.
Inferior courts may but need not be granted similar authority by Congress. Id. at 1509-11.
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"only court from which no appeal could constitutionally lie,"63 and I have
previously argued that Supreme Court rulings necessarily bind subsequent
inferior court decisions as authoritative precedent.64
3. Systemic Attributes.- "Systemic" attributes of the judicial power
are those that must be brought to bear on a particular case by the
combination of federal courts adjudicating that case, not necessarily by
each participating court. If Congress grants jurisdiction to only a single
Article I court, then of course that court must exercise all of the attributes
comprising the judicial power. However, if Congress grants jurisdiction
over a single case to multiple federal courts, then each court need not
redundantly exercise these attributes so long as they all are brought to bear
before the adjudication terminates.
Many, perhaps most, judicial power attributes identified by Liebman
and Ryan and others fall into this category. Perhaps the most obvious
example is finality, defined as invulnerability to revision or override. Each
federal court adjudicating a case need not-indeed, by definition cannot-
have the final word. What matters is that once appellate jurisdiction, if
any, is exhausted, the case produces a non-revisable "final word of the
department as a whole."' As explained previously,66 the attributes of
decisional independence and comprehensivity are systemic as well. Rules
of stare decisis, precedential authority, and law of the case all dictate that
one court defer substantially or completely to the conclusions of another.
Congress may permit one court to determine only a subset of legal issues
or consider only a subset of federal laws so long as the judicial department
en toto resolves the whole case based upon all applicable federal law.67
I tentatively think this is true of the attribute of effectualness as well; not
every court need be empowered to effectuate its own judgment so long as
the department en toto renders every case resolution effective in the end. 68
According to this view it is the judiciary, not each court, that must decide
the case independently, finally, and effectually based on all pertinent
federal law.
63. Amar, supra note 1, at 221 n.60.
64. See Caminker, supra note 13, at 828-34.
65. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 227 (1994).
66. See supra text accompanying notes 36-53.
67. For example, Congress could establish an appellate Court for Statutory Review that would
review and revise only issues decided by district courts involving the proper construction of federal
statutes, leaving unreviewed and intact the district courts' rulings on all other matters. Or, Congress
could establish an appellate Constitutional Court which would review and revise only the constitutional
rulings of district courts.
68. For example, Congress might refer all remedial questions, or a subset thereof (say, those
involving institutional reform), to specialized Article I tribunals; conventional federal courts would
determine questions of liability but leave the effectuation of their judgments entirely to the Remedial
Court.
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For the most part, the preceding classification of various judicial
power attributes tracks their historical treatment by the Supreme Court.
My tentative classification of additional attributes, such as Sager's anti-
conscription doctrine and the effectualness requirement, reflects my
provisional assessment of the functions those attributes are thought to serve
and the allocation required to serve those functions. A more compre-
hensive evaluation of the allocative features of each and every claimed
judicial power attribute would, of course, demand careful scrutiny of an
array of both formalist and functionalist justifications for the definition and
allocation of judicial power. My more modest goal here is simply to
highlight the need for, and facilitate through taxonomy and reconceptualiza-
tion, such a comprehensive inquiry.
IV. Reconciling the Allocative Taxonomy of Judicial Power Attributes
with the Discrete Vesting Postulate
The foregoing taxonomy makes clear that, at least with respect to
certain attributes, courts are not all created equal. By either constitutional
design or congressional decree, certain courts enjoy some attributes (such
as finality) that others do not. How can this differential allocation of
judicial power among various federal courts be squared with the conven-
tional view that "the Supreme Court and the inferior federal courts have
the same judicial power-they are vested with the judicial power of the
United States-even though they have different jurisdictions"?69 Certainly
judges and scholars have occasionally acknowledged that different courts
seem to have different capacities and responsibilities, but few have offered
any explanation of how their observations square with the discrete-vesting
hypothesis. In this Part, I briefly explore three alternative efforts to
resolve this tension, in ascending order of promise. While none is free of
difficulty, each highlights the need for greater focus on the allocative
aspects of particular judicial power attributes.
A. Further Nuancing the Definition of Judicial Power
One way to redress the practice-postulate gap, while maintaining the
view that each Article III court enjoys exactly the same judicial power,
would be to define the content of that power in such a nuanced way as to
incorporate the permissible inter-court constraints on decisional authority.
For example, instead of defining the judicial power to include the attribute
of "finality," one could characterize the attribute as "finality with respect
to all non-Article III actors and all inferior or coordinate Article III
actors." Instead of the attribute of "interpretive independence," Article III
69. Harrison, supra note 1, at 214-15.
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could encompass "interpretive independence from the views of non-Article
III actors and all inferior or coordinate Article I actors." Instead of a
duty to "invoke the whole supreme law applicable to a case," Article III
could impose a duty to "invoke all of the supreme law applicable to a case
except that which has been congressionally withheld for application to the
same case by another Article III tribunal." This definitional revision would
not only preserve Yakus and like cases,70 but it would also account for res
judicata rules requiring one federal court to credit the previous adjudication
of specific claims and issues by another federal court." By thus nuancing
the definitions of specific attributes of judicial power, one can account for
their susceptibility to inter-court allocation by Congress while adhering to
the discrete-vesting postulate.
However, relaxing the practice-postulate tension in this manner comes
at some cost to conceptual elegance. One of the appeals of a global
description of the judicial power's essential attributes, such as that Liebman
and Ryan provide,' is its simplicity. Concepts such as interpretive
independence and comprehensivity are useful parts of our lexicon partly
because they are basic and straightforward. In comparison, the preceding
definitions are quite awkward and unwieldy. The more one builds such
complicating nuances into the definition of each attribute just to satisfy the
one-size-fits-all constraint, the more one risks undermining the attribute's
usefulness for basic descriptive purposes.
More significantly, definitional complexity may jeopardize the
durability of these judicial power attributes in the face of congressional
incursions. In the long run, it may be easier for a court to defend its own
judicial power when it can articulate that power's attributes in bold and
straightforward terms such as "finality"-even if the attribute's application
is guided by a distinct allocative feature such as "systemic"-than if the
very definition of finality comes riddled with hedges and qualifications. If
descriptive choices have such normative consequences, then this nuanced
approach satisfies the one-size-fits-all requirement only by risking a
reduction of that size in the long run.
Finally, this approach to redressing the practice-postulate gap is
normatively agnostic. To be sure, once one determines the properly
nuanced definition of each and every judicial power attribute (including
necessary cross-references to other courts' powers, awkward as this may
be), one can vest that definition identically in each federal court. But how
does one determine the properly nuanced definitions in the first place?
70. See supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text.
71. See Liebman & Ryan, supra note 8, at 830-31 (linking Yakus's holding with res judicata
principles).
72. See supra text accompanying note 24.
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This approach provides no vocabulary or analytic tools to advance this key
normative inquiry.
B. A Function-Fulfillment Approach to Implementing the Judicial Power's
Attributes
A second way to close the practice-postulate gap would be to maintain
the simplistic definition of each judicial power attribute but also defend the
proposition that individual courts may sometimes decide or be congres-
sionally directed not to exercise their full complement of discretely-vested
powers. Liebman and Ryan offer such a defense. They develop a func-
tional approach to interpreting "[t]he judicial Power" that resolves the
practice-postulate tension by softening the discrete-vesting notion's
formalist cast. In light of Article III's textual, conceptual, and drafting
connections to the Supremacy Clause, these scholars conclude that the
judicial power is meant primarily to ensure the supremacy of federal over
state law and secondarily to ensure the priority of constitutional over other
forms of federal law.73 Thus a federal court given unique jurisdiction
over a case must exercise the full attributes of judicial power because that
is the constitutional mechanism for maintaining supremacy.
When more than one federal court adjudicates a single case, Liebman
and Ryan propose, each court need not act redundantly in serving the
purposes of Article III. If one Article III court brings each of the essential
judicial power attributes to bear in a given case, then a second such court
entertaining the same case need not do so because the first court has
fulfilled Article III's functions. As Liebman and Ryan put it, the function
of Article III courts is:
to engage in "independent judicial review . . . to the end that the
Constitution as the supreme law of the land may be maintained."
Accordingly, although the "whole supreme law" and other qualitative
ingredients of "[t]he judicial Power" are the constitutionally
mandated means to Article III's overriding supremacy-maintaining
end, once that end is achieved, the means' constitutional protection
lapses. 74
Thus, "once an Article III court has finally resolved a litigant's claim, the
federal 'judicial Power' has been exercised fully, and no other federal
court-whether coordinate (as in Yakus) or, especially, the same or an
inferior federal court (as in the law of the case context)-has any Article
III or supremacy-based obligation to exercise that 'Power' anew."' To
73. Liebman & Ryan, supra note 8, at 702-03.
74. Id. at 862.
75. Id. at 881 n.884 (emphasis in original). Considering exceptions to the "whole case" and
"whole law" attributes, the authors observe:
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put it another way, a federal court may decide or be congressionally
instructed not to assert its discretely-vested judicial power-in essence, to
act as if impotent-whenever the supremacy-maintaining purposes of the
power have been fulfilled by other courts.
This function-fulfillment approach might be invoked to explain away
the tension between the theoretical one-size-fits-all judicial power and its
observed differential allocations. The approach can account for both theory
and practice if it turns out that essential attributes are allocated away from
a given court only when they are vested elsewhere in the judiciary such
that the overall allocation fully secures Article III's supremacy-maintaining
purposes. Liebman and Ryan take great care to show this is true.
This function-fulfillment approach constitutes an improvement over the
nuanced definition approach in several respects. First, it uses the familiar
definitions of the various judicial power attributes such as finality and
interpretive independence, securing the descriptive and normative benefits
of a simple lexicon. Second, it more clearly reflects the notion of a unified
judiciary, that federal courts work in tandem toward systemic goals rather
than as discrete actors working in isolation. Finally, it self-consciously
imports an overarching normative framework for determining how the
various judicial power attributes must be brought to bear by the federal
judiciary in a given case.76
On the other hand, this approach has a conceptual difficulty of its
own: grafting a function-fulfillment shoot onto a discrete-vesting branch
proves a somewhat strained and inelegant means of resolving the practice-
postulate tension.7 Let me illustrate by example. Consider a conven-
tional case moving up through the judicial hierarchy. The district court
hearing the case in the first instance must bring to bear all of the essential
elements of the judicial power to secure the supremacy of national law,
The decisionmaking qualities that define "[t]he judicial Power" are not inherent attributes
of judges as judges. Instead, they are the Framers' chosen qualitative means to the
supremacy-maintaining objective to which the Constitution most fundamentally commits
federal judges. Although the capacity and duty to achieve that supremacy-maintaining
objective through those qualitative means in a case over which jurisdiction has been
conferred does absolutely inhere in the constitutional status of Article III judges, once that
structural objective has been achieved in the case, the previously sacrosanct qualitative
means lose their absolute protection.
Id. at 836 (emphasis added).
76. Of course, one can logically embrace Liebman and Ryan's function-fulfillment approach even
if one replaces their characterization of Article Il's function as supremacy-maintenance with a different
proposed function.
77. I wish to make clear that this was not the task that Liebman and Ryan self-consciously
undertook, even though they do embrace the discrete-vesting postulate. Liebman and Ryan deploy their
judicial power definitions to justify and explain case law, not to respond to any challenge to the
discrete-vesting postulate per se. I merely suggest that their solution to one problem cannot easily be
employed to solve the different problem I pose here.
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in a separate filing.78 If an appeal is taken, the reviewing court may leave
in place any and all aspects of the district court's decision that implement
the judicial power. The district court's decision by hypothesis exhausts the
judicial power; the appellate court need do no more. But this creates a
conceptual oddity. According to Liebman and Ryan's argument, the dist-
rict court's adjudication fully exhausts the function of Article III, and thus
the attributes of judicial power thereafter lose their constitutional status
with respect to this particular case. This means that the reviewing court
of appeals would have no constitutional duty to exercise the power pur-
portedly vested in it despite the fact that certain attributes-such as the duty
to "decide the case"-are viewed as mandatory.
79
Consider a second oddity. Suppose Congress directs the court of
appeals (but not the district court) to grant a heavy presumption of validity
to the state statute under review, say by instructing the court of appeals to
invalidate the state statute only if it is "unconstitutional beyond a
reasonable doubt." Strictly speaking, under Liebman and Ryan's view, the
court of appeals is no longer bound by the constraints of the judicial
power; the power's purposes were already fulfilled by the independent
district court judgment being reviewed, such that the appellate court lacks
any "Article III or supremacy-based obligation to exercise that 'Power'
anew."' According to their view, the appellate court's decision to accede
to Congress's instruction would not appear to violate its vestment of
judicial power; that power by definition has been rendered void.
I have no doubt Liebman and Ryan would nevertheless conclude that
Congress's instruction to the court of appeals is unconstitutional. Perhaps
they would respond that the appellate decision would be tainted in a
manner that undoes the district court's prior fulfillment of the judicial
power's functions. In other words, the district court's original exercise of
decisional independence would retroactively be overridden and should no
longer be considered to fulfill the judicial power's purposes. But this
response does not sit well with the discrete-vesting postulate because it
makes the district court's satisfaction of Article III contingent on another
court's subsequent behavior. One could not definitively determine whether
78. A court in a previous case might have supplied an independent interpretation of the governing
law that should now guide the instant case's resolution through the doctrines of stare decisis or
hierarchical precedent. Or, a court in a previous case might have decided or potentially decided some
legal issues that form part of the instant case and should now be incorporated by reference through the
doctrine of res judicata or the holding of Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944). See supra notes
48-53 and accompanying text.
79. See Liebman & Ryan, supra note 8, at 752 ("[Flederal judges would be required to deploy
the qualities-the decisionmaking powers and responsibilities-inherent in '[t]he Judicial Power' and
thus inherent in every court constituted by or under the judiciary article.") (emphasis added).
80. Id. at 881 n.884.
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the district court's exercise of judicial power in fact fulfilled its discrete
supremacy-based obligations until one knew if and how its decision was
reviewed on appeal.
Professor Liebman has suggested to me a possible response to these
conceptual oddities, one that "appeal[s] to the supremacy-maintaining
integrity and logic of a system designed to have inferior and superior
courts. Insofar as appellate jurisdiction is conferred, then the appellate
court's duty is to exercise the judicial power to constrain the lower
court.""' In other words, once Congress exercises its discretionary power
over the "when and where" of jurisdiction by authorizing an appeal from
the district court's decision, the appellate court assumes the duty to ensure
that the lower court's decision fulfills the supremacy-maintaining function
of the judicial power by holding it to the supreme national law.
This response is quite appealing. However, it clearly backpedals from
the discrete-vesting postulate. The function-fulfillment approach is
consistent with this postulate only because each court is considered to bear
identically the responsibility of fully exercising the judicial power, except
to the extent that some or all attributes of this power have previously been
exercised in a supremacy-maintaining way by another Article III court. In
my preceding hypothetical, once the district court has fully exhausted the
judicial power's attributes by bringing them to bear satisfactorily on the
instant case, the appellate court simply has no obligation "to exercise that
'Power' anew."' In contrast, Liebman's response proposes that the
appellate court still has some judicial power duties despite their previous
exhaustion by the district court. It thus backtracks from the strict function-
fulfillment approach superimposed on a discrete-vesting premise.
Rather, the suggestion that the appellate court must ignore Congress's
directions and exercise interpretive independence embraces a more global
perspective on the judiciary's supremacy-maintaining function than the
discrete-vesting hypothesis entails. The core intuition is that an
independent judicial interpretation should be brought permanently to bear
on the instant case by whatever combination of courts Congress authorizes
to decide that case; it is not enough for one court to exercise the judicial
power if a reviewing court will subsequently undo that exercise with a
supremacy-undermining final resolution.
I believe the intuition that my hypothetical congressional instruction
to the appellate court is unconstitutional is best captured by a systemic view
of the judicial power, viz., that the final decision of the judicial department
writ large must reflect an independence of judgment free from a
81. Professor Liebman offered this suggestion when helpfully commenting on an earlier draft of
this essay.
82. Liebman & Ryan, supra note 8, at 881 n.884.
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congressionally-imposed obligation of deference to non-Article III actors'
determinations. Indeed, both the "nuanced-definition" and "function-
fulfillment" approaches to defining the judicial power reflect a global
vision that Article III requires certain judicial power attributes to be applied
to individual cases, even if those attributes may be divided among various
federal courts rather than imbued in each one.
However, as illustrated above, efforts to square this systemic vision
with the discrete-vesting postulate prove somewhat awkward and inelegant.
It therefore seems desirable to consider an alternative understanding of the
Vesting Clause's mechanics, one that fits more naturally with the systemic
view of the judicial power.
C. Replacing the Discrete-Vesting Postulate with an Aggregate-Vesting
Postulate
One can build on Liebman and Ryan's insight that the judicial power
should be understood in functional terms, but jettison the awkward baggage
of the discrete-vesting postulate by embracing what I call the "aggregate-
vesting postulate." This postulate holds that the Vesting Clause bestows
the judicial power on the federal judiciary as a whole, not on each member
court thereof. As a generalization, it is the judiciary, not necessarily each
court, that must decide the case independently, finally, and effectually
based on all pertinent federal law. Whether a specific judicial power
attribute need be exercised by a specific court within the unified judiciary
turns on a further specification of that attribute's allocational nature,
meaning whether that attribute should be considered intrinsic, hierarchical,
or systemic.' In other words, one can determine whether a given federal
court must exercise a particular attribute by considering its allocational
nature and then, if appropriate, considering whether other courts hearing
some or all components of the instant case have or will separately bring
that attribute to bear in a final sense. With the aggregate-vesting postulate,
there is no need to resort to awkward, complicating definitions or concept-
ualizations to square such allocations with a one-size-fits-all vesting
premise.
The Supreme Court, although not purporting to choose between the
discrete-vesting and aggregate-vesting approaches, has frequently employed
language revealing a systemic understanding of the judicial power. It is
worth noting, for example, that Chief Justice Marshall's canonical
statement that the judicial power includes the duty or power to "say what
the law is" imposes that duty on "the judicial department," not each
individual Article III court. 4 More recently, in the context of defining
83. See supra notes 54-68 and accompanying text.
84. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803); see also Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm,
Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 218 (1995) ("Article III establishes a 'judicial department' with the 'province and
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the attribute of finality, the Court observed that "Article III creates... not
a batch of unconnected courts, but a judicial department composed of
"'inferior courts' and 'one supreme Court,"' and an inferior court decision
is not necessarily "the final word of the department as a whole."'
The greatest obstacle to embracing the aggregate-vesting postulate is
not conceptual, but textual. I concede that the aggregate-vesting postulate
does not reflect the most natural reading of the Constitution, which vests
the judicial power "in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as
the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish."' When read
in isolation from other interpretive clues, the phrase ", and in" seems to
support one of two propositions. Either the judicial power is vested in
each discrete federal court, or the power is vested both fully in the
Supreme Court and fully in the aggregation of inferior courts Congress
chooses to create. I also concede that the phrase ", and in" seems
unnecessary to capture the aggregate-vesting postulate. If the framers
subscribed to the aggregate-vesting postulate, it would have been more
straightforward to vest the judicial power "in one supreme Court and such
inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish."
On the other hand, this latter formulation might have generated some
confusion as to whether the creation of the Supreme Court was left to
congressional discretion; it could have been read as permitting Congress
to establish zero or one supreme court and any number of inferior courts.
Therefore, the ", and in" may have been intended merely to make clear
that Congress controls the inferior but not the supreme tribunal's existence,
and hence not intended to embrace a discrete-vesting over an aggregate-
vesting approach. Liebman and Ryan take issue with this suggestion."'
They maintain that "[t]he biggest difficulty" with this explanation of the ",
and in" phrase "is that the 'permissive "may"' is nowhere to be found in
the Wilson-Rutledge draft where the second 'in' first appears."'  The
opening sentence of the relevant section of the Wilson-Rutledge draft
duty... to say what the law is' in particular cases and controversies.") (quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) at 177).
85. Plaut, 514 U.S. at 227 (emphasis in original).
86. U.S. CONST. art. ll, § 1.
87. They do so in responding to Akhil Amar's similar suggestion. See Amar, supra note 1, at232
n.88 (claiming that the word "in" was "simply reinserted for the sake of grammatical clarity; without
it, Article III might have been read to imply that the permissive 'may' language concerning the creation
of inferior courts also applied to the Supreme Court, whose establishment was intended to be
mandatory."). Liebman and Ryan's response is really directed at Amar's misleading equation of the
terms "judicial power" and "jurisdiction" that drives his desire to minimize the significance of the ",
and in" language. See Liebman & Ryan, supra note 8, at 740-41 n.216. But they also offer the
response I now discuss in the text.
88. Liebman & Ryan, supra note 8, at 741 n.216.
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provided as follows: "The Judicial Power of the United States shall be
vested in one Supreme (National) Court, and in such (other) <inferior>
Courts as shall, from Time to Time, be constituted by the Legislature of
the United States."89 It is true that in this draft Congress's authority over
inferior tribunals is introduced by "shall" rather than "may" as the final
text provides. But the clause still gives Congress discretion over inferior
court formation; there is no other way to read the phrase "from Time to
Time." Thus, a careful drafter might have worried that, in the absence of
the ", and in" clause-divider, readers might erroneously understand that the
congressional discretion to constitute inferior courts "from Time to Time"
relates to the Supreme Court as well. Liebman and Ryan deny that the
Vesting Clause would have been ambiguous in this respect even without the
", and in" clause-divider,' but surely it is at least plausible that the
drafters would have lacked Liebman and Ryan's confidence and included
the clause-divider in an abundance of caution.
Of course, there remains the question whether, even if the ", and in"
clause-divider was inserted into the Wilson-Rutledge draft to clarify that
Congress lacked discretion over the Supreme Court's existence, the clause
also had the foreseeable effect of endorsing one of the two more "natural"
approaches to the vesting of judicial power.91 As Professor Liebman has
observed, a careful drafter could have clarified the Supreme Court's
mandatory status without having to use language that seemingly supported
a discrete-vesting rather than an aggregate-vesting approach.' For
example, Article III could have mimicked Article I and opened: "The
judicial Power of the United States shall be vested in a national judiciary,
which shall consist of one supreme Court, and of such inferior Courts as
the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." That the
drafters did not employ such a formulation, but intentionally chose
language less consistent with the aggregate-vesting postulate (even if
designed to accomplish a different purpose), might be viewed as fortifying
the textual obstacle to embracing this alternative perspective.
Still, I hesitate to conclude that the text definitively rules out the
aggregate-vesting interpretation. It is conceivable, for example, that the
drafters used the ", and in" phrase and structure rather than other available
textual formulations to underscore a point made earlier about the judicial
power's allocation: certain attributes of that power apply uniquely or
89. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 172 (Max Farrand, ed., 1911).
90. See Liebman & Ryan, supra note 8, at 741 n.216.
91. See supra text accompanying note 86 (arguing that under a "plain meaning" approach, the",
and in" phrase suggests that the judicial power is either vested discretely in each congressionally
established inferior court, or vested in the aggregation of all such inferior courts).
92. See supra note 81.
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differently to the Supreme Court than to the inferior courts in the Article
I hierarchy.93
Moreover, before one rejects the aggregate-vesting postulate because
of its textual deficiencies, at the very least one must consider its
comparative interpretive advantages over the discrete-vesting postulate.
The conventional approach may be better grounded in Article M's text, but
it can be squared with the differential allocation of judicial power attributes
only by embracing either the nuanced-definition or functional-fulfillment
approaches, each of which poses conceptual difficulties of its own.
D. The Unified Judiciary Approach Revisited
The three proposed means of reconciling the differential allocation of
judicial power attributes with a one-size-fits-all approach to the vesting of
that power have distinct strengths and weaknesses. They do, however,
share a common and critical theme. Each, in its own way, highlights the
importance of focusing on the allocative aspects of the judicial power's
various attributes.
Various challenges to Congress's recent restrictions on the manner of
federal court adjudication take the following form:
(a) X is an essential attribute of the judicial power;
(b) the provision in question deprives a specific federal court of X;
(c) therefore, the provision violates Article M.
Conclusion (c) assumes that any deprivation of any court's attribute X
deprives that court of its discretely vested authority and thus violates
Article III, whether or not other federal courts are similarly burdened.
This assumption is simply false. Whether depriving a specific court
of attribute X violates Article III turns on whether X is an intrinsic,
hierarchical, or systemic attribute, and perhaps (if X falls into one of the
latter two categories) where X has been allocated by Congress within the
unified judiciary. The following Part illustrates how the conventional one-
size-fits-all approach can mislead, by considering a current challenge to the
constitutionality of one provision of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996. 94
93. See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
94. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (amending 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244, 2253-2255 and
adding §§ 2261-2266).
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V. Illustrating the Unified Judiciary Approach: the Constitutionality of
Amended Section 2254(d)(1) of the Recent Habeas Reforms
As amended by the AEDPA, section 2254(d) of the Judicial Code now
provides, in relevant part:
"An application for a writ of habeas corpus... shall not be granted
with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State
court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim
-(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States."95
Habeas petitioners have argued that this provision violates Article III in two
respects: it requires all federal courts to give undue deference to state court
decisions and requires lower federal courts to give undue deference to the
United States Supreme Court's rulings.
The Supreme Court recently interpreted section 2254(d)(1) to require
federal habeas courts to grant some degree of deference under certain
circumstances to the legal rulings of state courts. 96 Several scholars have
previously suggested that such an interpretation would be constitutionally
problematic, compromising the attribute of "interpretive independence." '
I will not pursue this inquiry here, because the unified judiciary approach
I propose adds little to this particular dispute. The Court's interpretation
of section 2254(d)(1) as requiring deference to the state courts' objectively
reasonable application of federal law applies to all federal courts, inferior
and Supreme. Assuming arguendo that section 2254(d)(1) unduly infringes
upon the judicial attribute of independent judgment, it violates the Vesting
Clause whether this attribute is classified as intrinsic, hierarchical, or
systemic. Congress cannot withdraw even hierarchical or systemic
attributes -entirely from the federal judiciary writ large.98
95. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (Supp. IV 1998).
96. In Williams v. Taylor, 120 S. Ct. 1495 (2000), Justice O'Connor authored an opinion of the
Court addressing the proper interpretation of § 2254(d)(1). The Court held that
[A]n unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of
federal law.... Under § 2254(d)(1)'s "unreasonable application" clause, then, a federal
habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent
judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law
erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.
Id. at 1522; see also id. at 1521 (framing the question as whether "the state court's application of
clearly established federal law was objectively unreasonable") (emphasis added).
97. See Liebman & Ryan, supra note 8, at 864-84; see also Evan Tsen Lee, Section 2254(d) of
the NewHabeas Statute:An (Opinionated) User's Manual, 51 VAND. L. REV. 103, 131-36 (1998) (both
considering constitutional difficulties posed by various interpretations of § 2254(d)(1)).
98. I tentatively believe that freedom from mandated deference to a non-Article 1I actor is best
considered an intrinsic attribute, for reasons analogous to those explaining why Sager's anti-conscription
rule should be so considered. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text. If such interpretive
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The unified judiciary approach has much more to say about the second
constitutional challenge to section 2254(d)(1) which concerns Congress's
authority to modify conventional rules of precedent. Habeas petitioners
have argued that section 2254(d)(1) unduly infringes upon the judicial
power of inferior federal courts by allowing them to assess the correctness
of state court decisions only by reference to "clearly established Federal
law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.""
This argument can be understood only against the backdrop of Teague
v. Lane,to which prohibits federal habeas courts from providing relief
based on "new rules" of law. More specifically, the case holds that a
petitioner can secure relief only if the favorable rule she asks the habeas
court to apply to her case was "clearly established" at the time her state
conviction became final.' °' Under Teague, the rule could be "clearly
established" by circuit or Supreme Court precedent.1°2  In contrast,
section 2254(d)(1) makes clear that petitioners may rely on only those rules
clearly established by Supreme Court precedent. It is this "retrenchment
from [the] former practice [of] allow[ing] the United States courts of
appeals to rely on their own jurisprudence in addition to that of the
Supreme Court""0 3 that raises interesting questions concerning Congress's
freedom were merely a systemic attribute (and surely it is at least that), then Congress could mandate
or a court could decide voluntarily that a court issuing a non-final decision should defer to an external
actor's view, knowing that this view could prevail only until reviewed by a nondeferential court. It
seems quite odd to countenance a temporary expression of a legal ruling that will necessarily change
before the case becomes final.
99. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (Supp. IV 1998).
100. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
101. Id. at 310 ("[N]ew constitutional rules of criminal procedure will not be applicable to those
cases which have become final before the new rules are announced."). Teague and its progeny use
various terms to describe the standard used to determine whether a favorable rule qualifies as settled
or new. See, e.g., Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 395 (1994) (describing a rule as new if
"reasonable jurists [could] disagree" based on precedent) (quoting Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 234
(1990)). "Clearly established" is a sufficient characterization for my purposes. Teague recognized
exceptions for new rules that either immunize behavior from criminal sanction or create "watershed"
criminal procedure rules protecting the innocent. Teague, 489 U.S. at 307, 311 ("First, a new rule
should be applied retroactively if it places 'certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond
the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe.' Second, a new rule should be applied
retroactively if it requires the observance of 'those procedures.., that are implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty.'") (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692-93 (1971) (Harlan, J.,
concurring) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937))). Section 2254(d)(1)
incorporates no such exceptions.
102. See, e.g., Caspari, 510 U.S. at 393-95 (reviewing the decisions of federal courts of appeals
and state courts of last resort as part of the Teague analysis); Ciak v. United States, 59 F.3d 296, 301-
03 (2d. Cir. 1995) (applying the Teague standard and treating circuit precedent as governing the
determination of a rule's "newness").
103. Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 869 (7th Cir. 1996); see also, e.g., Williams v. Taylor, 120
S. Ct. 1495, 1523 (2000) ("§ 2254(d)(1) restricts the source of clearly established law to this Court's
jurisprudence"); Sweeney v. Parke, 113 F.3d 716, 718 (7th Cir. 1997) ("[Circuit courts are] no longer
permitted to apply [their] own jurisprudence, but must look exclusively to Supreme Court
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authority to modify or eliminate the conventional rules of stare decisis and
precedent governing the binding authority of circuit court rulings.t 4
Suppose a habeas petitioner claims that her state court conviction was
secured in violation of constitutional rule X, that the relevant circuit court
of appeals had adopted rule X at t= 1, a time before the state conviction
became final, and that the Supreme Court has never issued a ruling on
point or anywhere near it. Under Teague, the circuit ruling issued at t= 1
(call it CAI) could qualify as clearly established law 5 and the petitioner
could rely on rule X when challenging her conviction at t=2. Under
section 2254(d)(1), however, federal courts must adjudicate her habeas
claim at t=2 (call it DC2 for district courts or CA2 for courts of appeal) as
if precedent CA, simply did not exist.
Petitioners' argument that section 2254(d)(1)'s mandated ignorance of
CA, violates Article III has been articulated in various ways. I think the
argument is most clearly put and evaluated by separating it into two
different components, each embracing a different temporal perspective.
First, section 2254(d)(1) is assertedly unconstitutional from the perspective
of the court issuing CA, because it "attempts to remove the stare decisis
effect from constitutional rulings by Article III courts."t' Second,
section 2254(d)(1) is assertedly unconstitutional from the perspective of the
court issuing DC2 or CA2 because it violates the comprehensivity attribute
by preventing these subsequent courts "from applying the entire body of
supreme federal law to cases before them." 7 I consider these perspec-
tives in turn.
According to the petitioners' first challenge, one judicial power
attribute is "precedential status," meaning that judicial rulings have binding
force through the doctrines of hierarchical precedent and stare decisis; the
former absolutely binding courts considered subordinate to the deciding
104. Of course, one might question whether Teague itself is inconsistent with Article III because
Teague requires federal courts to violate (depending on how the case is characterized) either the
interpretive independence, comprehensivity, or remedial effectualness requirements. See Liebman &
Ryan, supra note 8, at 852. However, Liebman and Ryan defend Teague as consistent with these
attributes because it preserves their supremacy-maintaining function. See id. at 855-63. I assume here,
as must those raising the current constitutional challenge to § 2254(d)(1), that Teague is a valid doctrine
against which "retrenchment" must be evaluated.
105. I assume here that there is no circuit split on point which would complicate the hypothetical.
106. Motion of Marvin E. Frankel, et al. for Leave to Appear as Amici Curiae and Brief in
Support of Petitioner, Williams v. Taylor, 120 S. Ct. 1495 (2000) (No. 98-8384), available in LEXIS,
1998 U.S. Briefs 8384, at *29 [hereinafter Frankel Brie]; see also id. at *17 ("A Congressional
attempt to undermine the stare decisis effect of rulings on constitutional issues by lower Article III
judges would be a[n]... offensive breach of the separation of powers.").
107. Id. at *27; see also Lindh, 96 F.3d at 887 (Ripple, J., dissenting) ("To require the federal
judiciary to hold that there is no constitutional violation simply because there is no case of the Supreme
Court of the United States directly on point, is to deny it the right to refer to the corpus of
jurisprudence to which it turns when it must 'say what the law is.'") (quoting Marbury v. Madison,
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
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court and the latter presumptively binding subsequent rulings by the same
court. It follows, petitioners claim, that this attribute is unduly
compromised by Congress's decree in section 2254(d)(1) that CA, lacks
either precedential or stare decisis force for future habeas cases." 8
Some petitioners and scholars have suggested that this position finds
support in City of Boerne v. Flores,'° in which the Supreme Court
arguably held that Congress may not "withdraw the stare decisis [and
presumably precedential] effect of the [Supreme] Court's constitutional
interpretations."1 If one strictly embraces the discrete-vesting
postulate's one-size-fits-all characterization of the judicial power, one must
conclude that if precedential status is an essential attribute of the Supreme
Court's constitutional rulings then it is likewise an essential attribute of
circuit and district court rulings. Under this conventional approach it is
methodologically sufficient to demonstrate that Congress cannot strip
Supreme Court decisions of their precedential status; the extension of this
argument to all federal courts follows as a matter of course.
The unified judiciary approach shows this extension to be over-
simplistic. To begin with, while for completely different reasons I agree
with the basic premise that Article III requires Supreme Court rulings to
bind subsequent inferior court decisionmaking," I am dubious about this
reading of Boerne."' In any event, the important methodological point
108. This caveat, "for future habeas cases," is significant. Some have suggested that federal court
rulings must have some precedential implications because "the court that is deciding an issue must do
so with awareness that it is not only deciding the dispute between the parties before it, but that it is also
deciding on a basis that may help set a rule followed by other courts. In this sense, stare decisis may
be conducive to more responsible decisionmaking by courts faced with novel or difficult issues."
Jackson, supra note 9, at 2470 (citations omitted). Notwithstanding § 2254(d)(1), ruling CA, could
still have precedential and stare decisis implications for other types of cases (e.g., either direct or
habeas review of federal criminal prosecutions). Perhaps this provides sufficient incentive for
responsible decisionmaking to satisfy this asserted attribute of judicial power.
109. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
110. Liebman & Ryan, supra note 8, at 838; see also Jackson, supra note 9, at 2469 ("Boerne
could be read to suggest that decisions of Article IIM courts [have] the ordinary weight stare decisis
would give them.").
111. See Caminker, supra note 13, at 818 ("[A] court is always bound to follow a precedent
established by a court 'superior' to it.") (emphasis in original).
112. This interpretation is based on the following pronouncement of the Boerne Court:
When the political branches of the Government act against the background of a judicial
interpretation of the Constitution already issued, it must be understood that in later cases
and controversies the Court will treat its precedents with the respect due them under
settled principles, including stare decisis, and contrary expectations must be disappointed.
RFRA was designed to control cases and controversies, such as the one before us; but.
. it is this Court's precedent, not RFRA, which must control.
Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536. The context of this discussion, however, concerned specific federalism and
separation of powers doctrines rather than the doctrines of precedent and stare decisis. I think the
Court's declaration that "this Court's precedent. . . must control" is not itself a reason for decision
based on an analysis of judicial power attributes, but merely a conclusion reached because RFRA was
held unconstitutional on other grounds. See Jackson, supra note 9, at 2469 (noting that Boerne
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is as follows: even if Article III precludes Congress from withdrawing
precedential or stare decisis effect from Supreme Court rulings, that does
not mean Article 1I similarly precludes Congress from withdrawing
precedential or stare decisis effect from circuit court rulings. The latter
conclusion assumes that the attribute of precedential status is either an
intrinsic attribute or a hierarchical one inhering in all appellate courts. If
instead it is a systemic or a hierarchical attribute inhering only in the
Supreme Court, then Congress can remove the precedential status of lower
court rulings so long as it does not similarly regulate Supreme Court
rulings. The argument that precedential status is either an intrinsic
attribute or a hierarchical attribute inhering in all appellate courts faces a
much higher burden.
I believe this higher burden is difficult to surmount.1 3  To begin
with, because district court decisions are not considered to enjoy preceden-
tial status," 4 the claim that such status is intrinsic to all Article III
adjudication seems weak. The most one can claim is that all Article III
courts having revisory jurisdiction over subordinate courts must issue
decisions with precedential status; this would make such status a hierar-
chical attribute that attaches to appellate adjudication. But even this
argument proves difficult to defend.
In my view, the constitutional requirement that inferior federal courts
respect Supreme Court precedents flows from the inferior-supreme relation-
ship specified in the text and confirmed by the structural design of Article
III. This argument "says nothing about the relationship among the tiers of
inferior federal courts.""5 The conventional doctrine of hierarchical
precedent that binds district courts to follow their reviewing court of
appeals' rulings is grounded, not in constitutional principle, but rather in
an amalgam of pragmatic arguments (e.g., judicial economy, expertise, and
uniformity). 6 Because precedential rules governing courts of appeals'
decisions essentially reflect common law rather than constitutional doctrine,
the rules seem properly subject to congressional regulation.
Moreover, one can ask Liebman and Ryan's question: whether the
supremacy-maintaining function of Article III requires federal district and
circuit court precedents established at t=1 to bind later federal courts
.appears to rest substantially on federalism-based grounds" and that therefore it is "unclear how much
significance to attach to the Court's separation of powers comments" quoted above).
113. My claim here is somewhat preliminary and tentative. My primary goal in this Essay is not
to resolve definitively the constitutional challenge to § 2254(d)(1), but merely to illustrate the
methodological difference between the conventional discrete-vesting postulate and my proposed unified
judiciary approach.
114. See Caminker, supra note 13, at 825 & n.31.
115. Id. at 837.
116. See id. at 839-56 (exploring justifications for the doctrine of hierarchical precedent).
1544 [Vol. 78:1513
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reviewing state court convictions at t =2. Another way to put this question
is whether DC2's or CA2's decision (following the new habeas statute) to
bind a state court to the rules established by Supreme Court precedents but
not precedents DC, and CA, frustrates the supremacy of national law. In
my view, while Congress might choose to bind state courts to follow
inferior federal court precedents (either for supremacy or other
purposes" 7), the supremacy of federal law does not seem to depend on
this relationship in the same way that it depends on state court fidelity to
Supreme Court precedents.
Some have suggested that a requirement of precedential authority
might be read into the Court's decision in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm,
Inc.," in which the Supreme Court invalidated a federal statute requiring
courts to reopen judgments that became final after exhaustion of the
available avenues of appeal."19  I do not read Plaut so broadly. Plaut
held that Congress cannot reopen or revise a final judgment so as to
terminate or modify the binding nature of the court's decree on the parties
before the court. Nothing in Plaut says that the Court meant to protect
from congressional revision both the final judicial decision's status as a
case disposition directly binding the parties and the decision's status as a
precedent indirectly governing non-parties.
Thus, neither functionalist justifications nor Supreme Court case law
provide strong support for the claim that precedent-setting is an intrinsic
or even hierarchical attribute, as opposed to a systemic one. If precedent-
setting is indeed a systemic attribute, this formulation of the challenge to
section 2254(d)(1) should fail."2
117. See supra text accompanying note 116.
118. 514 U.S. 211 (1995).
119. See Frankel Brief, supra note 106, at *16-17 (citing Plaut in support of the proposition that
Congress "[c]annot [p]revent the [liower [f]ederal [clourts from [a]dhering to [s]tare [d]ecisis");
Jackson, supra note 9, at 2469 (asserting that Plaut and Boerne taken together "might be read to
suggest that it is an essential element of Article III adjudication that the final judgments of Article III
courts matter as precedent"); id. at 2469-70 ("Plaut and Boerne suggest a vision of Article III courts
that requires Congress not only to leave their final judgments intact, but also to treat (and allow other
courts to treat) their decisions as having ordinary stare decisis effect.").
120. One might persuasively argue that congressional efforts to manipulate substantive outcomes
by selectively withdrawing the precedential status of courts of appeals' decisions would contravene
separation of powers principles. For example, a congressional mandate that district courts treat as
precedent only courts of appeals' rulings that are favorable to the government's litigation position might
well cross the line between a "necessary and proper" allocation of precedential authority and a blatant
attempt to gerrymander the substantive law in a desired direction. This congressional influence might
violate the spirit if not the letter of United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871). Section
2254(d)(1), however, withdraws precedential status from all circuit court decisions across the board and
can be justified by neutral principles governing the allocation of law-declaration and law-application
functions. See infra text accompanying notes 122-24. This provision, therefore, does not raise the
same threat of substance gerrymandering that my hypothetical does.
More generally, a congressional power to dictate the precedential impact of Supreme Court rather
than circuit court decisions would raise unique separation of powers concerns. If Congress could
suspend in an across-the-board fashion either the binding effect of all Supreme Court decisions on
1545
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The subtly distinct second constitutional challenge embraces the
temporal perspective of the courts issuing DC2 or CA2 at t=2. The claim
is that section 2254(d)(1) violates the comprehensivity attribute by
preventing these subsequent courts from considering CA, to be part of the
"applicable body of federal law" from which they may engage in reasoned
elaboration. In deciding whether a habeas petitioner may invoke rule X as
"clearly established" for purposes of Teague, the courts deciding DC2 and
CA2 may not even voluntarily rely on CA, in support of that position, and
they certainly are not bound to do so.
The discrete-vesting postulate holds that the judicial power attribute of
comprehensivity attaches to each and every Article III court. Thus,
assuming that prior judicial rulings count as part of the "body of law" from
which courts may reason in deciding subsequent cases, 121 it follows that
section 2254(d)(1) violates Article III because it precludes courts issuing
DC2 and CA2 from drawing upon the "whole supreme law."
In contrast, under the unified judiciary approach, this challenge to
section 2254(d)(1) fails if comprehensivity is considered a systemic rather
than an intrinsic attribute. If it is systemic, then Congress need only
ensure that some court or combination of courts within the judicial
hierarchy may consider the entirety of pertinent federal law. Section
2254(d)(1) arguably satisfies this weaker requirement. Habeas review
under Teague might be understood as implementing and extending the
inferior courts (by overriding the doctrine of hierarchical precedent) or the influential effect of all
Supreme Court rulings on the Court's own subsequent decisionmaking (by overriding the doctrine of
stare decisis), then Congress could still manipulate substantive outcomes through careful temporal
selectivity. Congress could prohibit courts from considering themselves bound by rules of precedent
and stare decisis during a period of time when Congress generally disagreed with important Supreme
Court rulings, and then Congress could later lift the prohibition after the Supreme and perhaps inferior
courts had exercised their new-found discretion to revise these important rulings in a congressionally
preferred direction. The prospect of such temporal manipulation might violate the spirit of Klein, albeit
through a subtle mechanism. This temporal concern, however, is not seriously implicated by
§ 2254(d)(1)'s withdrawal of the precedential status of circuit court decisions. These decisions
influence the fate of habeas petitions only until the Supreme Court has stepped in to settle the law.
Thus, even if Congress were to engage in a systematic practice of allowing habeas petitioners to invoke
clearly established circuit court precedents when such precedents were generally pro-government but
prohibiting petitioners from invoking circuit court precedents when they turned generally pro-petitioner,
Congress would have only a limited and arbitrary influence over habeas outcomes because at any time
the Supreme Court could issue a decision that would bind all lower courts whether it was pro-
government or pro-petitioner. The separation of powers concern raised by the prospect of temporal
selectivity is thus greatly muted when applied to circuit rather than Supreme Court precedents. See also
Caminker, supra note 13, at 828-34 (arguing that the constitutionally specified supreme-inferior
relationship between the Supreme Court and other federal courts uniquely ascribes precedential status
to Supreme Court decisions).
121. This premise itself remains underdeveloped. See Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and
Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspects of Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEXAS L. REV. 1, 24-
27 (1994) (arguing that binding precedents are best understood as judicial events that provide strong
pragmatic reasons for later courts to interpret positive law in the same way, rather than as sources of
positive law themselves).
1546
HeinOnline  -- 78 Tex. L. Rev.  1546 1999-2000
2000] Allocating the Judicial Power in a "Unified Judiciary"
Supreme Court's power of direct appellate review over state criminal
convictions, by authorizing federal courts to act as proxies for the Supreme
Court which lacks sufficient time and other resources to entertain all
federal claims on direct review." This habeas model thus divides the
responsibility for ensuring state court fidelity to federal constitutional
principles between the Supreme Court, which is given exclusive authority
to "say what the law is" that governs state court decisionmaking, and the
inferior federal courts, which are given concurrent authority to apply the
law so defined to discrete cases. Put differently, section 2254(d)(1)-like
Teague-divides the function of judicial decisionmaking into two com-
ponents, law-declaring and law-applying, and vests the former in the
Supreme Court alone while vesting the latter in all federal courts. If as
suggested earlier" comprehensivity is a systemic attribute, then it is
properly subject to congressional allocation among various federal courts
in this manner. 4  Thus the differing methodologies of the discrete-
vesting postulate and the unified judiciary approach lead to divergent
substantive conclusions.
VI. Conclusion
Congress's recent spate of statutes dictating the manner, in addition to
time and place, of Article III adjudication has prompted a resurgence of
judicial and scholarly attention to the content of "[t]he judicial Power."
However, focus on content alone, without simultaneous focus on the allo-
cative nature of that content, can provide misleading answers to the
questions now posed by the recent reforms. The conventional discrete-
vesting postulate has induced many to assume that the judicial power
necessarily comes in a one-size-fits-all package, an assumption that
confounds rather than clarifies analysis of current instances of arguable
infringement of judicial authority.
My taxonomy of allocative features and reconceptualization of the
Vesting Clause's mechanics are intended to provide a more descriptively
122. See Liebman & Ryan, supra note 8, at 882-83 (noting that § 2254(d)(1) suggests a view of
habeas "as a surrogate for Supreme Court direct review" by "requiring habeas courts to apply a rough
approximation of the law the Supreme Court assumedly would have applied in the case on direct appeal
certiorari, namely, 'clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court' as of the end
of direct appeal"). For further support of habeas review as essentially "appellate," see Jordan Steiker,
Habeas Exceptionalism, 78 TEXAS L. REV. 1725, 1748 (2000); Larry W. Yackle, A Primer on the New
Habeas Corpus Statute, 44 BuFF. L. REv. 381, 407-11 (1996) (exploring and ultimately rejecting the
possibility that AEDPA creates a form of appellate jurisdiction in federal district courts).
123. See supra notes 44-53, 67 and accompanying text.
124. Just as in Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944), the Court held that an enforcement
court need not have authority to consider the validity of the regulations being enforced so long as
another court theoretically available to the claimant enjoyed such authority, see supra notes 52-53 and
accompanying text, so too here the habeas enforcement court need not have authority to develop the
underlying constitutional rles to be applied so long as the Supreme Court retains such authority.
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accurate and prescriptively helpful framework for evaluating purported
infringements upon judicial authority. The move to a unified judiciary
perspective highlights the possibility that different component attributes
comprising the judicial power can have different allocative characteristics,
raising the question of whether a given attribute must be vested in all
Article III courts, a given level of the Article III judiciary, or merely in
any one Article III court. This framework reveals that each attribute does
not mechanically flow into each Article III court, but rather its proper
allocation turns on its precise function within the unified judiciary.
The nuanced-definition, function-fulfillment, and novel aggregate-
vesting approaches provide alternative ways in which this allocative
taxonomy can be squared with Article III's Vesting Clause. I find the
latter approach the most conceptually attractive. I recognize, however, that
some may resist embracing the aggregate-vesting postulate outright,
preferring the discrete-vesting approach for its historical pedigree and
somewhat more natural fit with Article III's syntax. One can instead reach
the same endpoint by massaging the conventional view, following either of
the other two approaches, although doing so raises some nontrivial concep-
tual difficulties. At the very least, the aggregate-vesting postulate provides
a useful heuristic, highlighting the allocation question as a central concern
rather than making it secondary or peripheral to content-definition. And,
as the illustrative application of the unified judiciary approach to one aspect
of recent habeas reform reveals, the question of how the judicial power's
attributes are vested is as important as what those attributes are.
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